This paper is concerned with a propositional modal logic with operators for necessity, actuality and apriority. The logic is characterized by a class of relational structures defined according to ideas of epistemic two-dimensional semantics, and can therefore be seen as formalizing the relations between necessity, actuality and apriority according to epistemic two-dimensional semantics. We can ask whether this logic is correct, in the sense that its theorems are all and only the informally valid formulas. This paper gives outlines of two arguments that jointly show that this is the case. The first is intended to show that the logic is informally sound, in the sense that all of its theorems are informally valid. The second is intended to show that it is informally complete, in the sense that all informal validities are among its theorems. In order to give these arguments, a number of independently interesting results concerning the logic are proven. In particular, the soundness and completeness of two different proof systems with respect to the semantics is proven (Theorems 11 and 15), as well as a normal form theorem (Theorem 23), an elimination theorem for the actuality operator (Corollary 27), and the decidability of the logic (Corollary 28).
Introduction
Epistemic two-dimensional semantics as proposed by David Chalmers, e.g., in Chalmers (2004) , provides an account of meaning that allows a possible worlds analysis of necessity as well as apriority. The notions of necessity and apriority intended here are those distinguished by Kripke (1972) ; the first is sometimes called metaphysical necessity. They can roughly be paraphrased by saying that necessary is what could not have failed to be the case, and a priori is what can be known in an a priori way. In Fritz (2012) , a propositional modal logic with operators for necessity, the so-called actually operator, and apriority is defined in a way to capture the relevant ideas of epistemic two-dimensional semantics. In particular, a class of relational structures is defined, and it is argued that it represents the evaluation of sentences according to epistemic two-dimensional semantics, and that therefore, the logic characterized by this class captures the relations of the three modalities according to epistemic two-dimensional semantics. The motivation to do so in Fritz (2012) is to answer certain critics of epistemic two-dimensional semantics who claim that the theory poses difficulties for developing a systematic combinatorial semantics. In the first part of this section, I summarize the relevant definitions for this logic. In the second part of this section, I consider what it takes for this to be the correct logic of necessity, actuality and apriority. In the third part of this section, I sketch the overall strategy of arguing for the correctness of the logic which will be outlined in subsequent sections. As I will only be concerned with epistemic two-dimensional semantics, rather than other variants of two-dimensional semantics, I will drop the qualifier epistemic from now on for brevity.
A Logic for Two-Dimensional Semantics
Syntactically, the logic discussed in Fritz (2012) uses a standard propositional modal language with three operators for the three modalities. Letters like p and q are used as proposition letters; ¬ and ∧ are used as primitive Boolean operators; and is used for necessarily, A for a priori, and @ for actually. ♦ and C are used as the duals of and A. It is assumed that ♦ is used for possibly, and the symbol C is motivated by the suggestion in (Chalmers, 2004, p. 219 ) that conceivability and apriority are dual in the required way. Here, no such assumption is made; in fact, we will see reasons for doubting such a connection below.
In a first step to specify the semantics, a class M of Kripke frames called matrix frames is defined in Fritz (2012) as the class of frames F = W, R , R @ , R A , where W = S × S for some set S, and the relations are given by the following conditions:
• x, y R x , y iff y = y • x, y R @ x , y iff y = y and x = y • x, y R A x , y iff x = y From this, a class of frames with distinguished elements is derived. As defined in Segerberg (1971) , a frame with distinguished elements, in short fwde, is a frame to which a subset of the set of points is added. Models are obtained from these as in the case of frames by adding a valuation function, and the definition of truth at a point in a model stays the same. Only the definitions of validity and consequence are changed by restricting them to the distinguished points. Logics characterized by classes of fwdes need not be normal, as they need not be closed under the rule of generalization (if ϕ is a theorem so is ∇ϕ for any modal operator ∇). But they are quasi-normal, which means that they contain the smallest normal modal logic K and are closed under modus ponens and uniform substitution. With this, the formal semantics of the logic for twodimensional semantics is given by the class MD of matrix fwde, which are defined as the fwdes F = W, R , R @ , R A , D such that W, R , R @ , R A is a matrix frame and D = { x, x : x ∈ S}, where S is the set such that W = S × S. Note that I distinguish between frames and fwdes, as well as models based on such structures, using different fonts. E.g., I write F and M for frames and models based on them, and F and M for fwdes and models based on them.
A Question of Correctness
Given the logic characterized by MD, we can ask whether it is the correct logic of necessity, actuality and apriority. Answering this question is making a claim about the three modalities and their relations, namely that they behave according to this logic. Here are two reasons why one might be interested in answering this question: Firstly, it is a way of testing two-dimensional semantics. If the logic characterized by MD is not the correct logic of the three modalities, then two-dimensional semantics says something incorrect about them, which can be used as an argument against the theory. But if it is the correct one, then twodimensional semantics gets the relations of the modalities right (at least as far as they are captured in a propositional logic), which is a point in favor of the theory. Secondly, one might also be interested in the logic of necessity, actuality and apriority independently of two-dimensional semantics. Then an argument for the correctness of the logic characterized by MD shows that one can use this logic no matter what one thinks about two-dimensional semantics.
But what exactly does it mean for a logic to be the correct logic of necessity, actuality and apriority? Since here, a modal logic is just a set of formulas, a trivial answer follows from the identity criterion for sets: To be the correct logic of the three modalities is just to contain the same formulas as the correct logic. Let's call the formulas that are in the correct logic informally valid. Then we can split up the claim that the logic characterized by MD is the correct logic into two parts, adapting some familiar terminology: Say that it is informally sound if it contains only formulas that are informally valid, and informally complete if it contains all formulas that are informally valid. To be the correct logic can now be described as being informally sound and complete. Of course, unless we have an independent account of which formulas are informally valid, these are all just slight variations of saying the same thing. Before saying more about informal validity, let me point out that there are reasons for thinking that this account of being the correct logic of the three modalities is incomplete. (For brevity, let me just say that a logic is correct instead of saying that it is the correct logic of necessity, actuality and apriority, or whatever else it formalizes.)
One might argue that the basic concept in logic is not that of a formula being valid, but that of an argument being valid. Then the problem with the above account would be the assumption that the correct logic of the three modalities is given as a set of formulas. If this is right, then it would be more accurate to say that a logic is correct if it counts all and only the informally valid arguments as (formally) valid. Adapting standard terminology, we might call this strong correctness, and the notion of correctness described in the previous paragraph weak correctness. As above, these can then be divided up into strong and weak informal soundness and completeness.
To consider this in a bit more detail, let me assume the standard representation of arguments in modal logics as given by a set of premises and a single conclusion. As we will see later (as an immediate consequence of Theorem 11), the consequence relation over MD is compact (i.e., what is a consequence of a set of formulas is a consequence of a finite subset). So it follows from natural assumptions about informal validity that the logic characterized by MD is strongly informally sound if it is weakly informally sound. (The assumptions are an informal analog of the deduction theorem and the claim that a formula is informally valid if it follows informally from no premises.) But to infer that the logic is strongly informally complete from the assumption that it is weakly informally complete, we need the claim that informal consequence is compact, which we might call informal compactness. That it holds in the current modal context is by no means obvious, as pointed out in (Cresswell, 2009, p. 63) . So what I say below about informal completeness should be thought of as only pertaining to weak informal completeness, and leaving the question of strong informal completeness open, or depending on the assumption of informal compactness. While I acknowledge these complications, I won't consider them in the following, and therefore also return to the original terminology; i.e., writing just informal soundness and informal completeness for what has here been called weak informal soundness and completeness.
Taking a stand on the correct understanding of informal validity is beyond the scope of this paper. But to see which parts of the arguments for informal soundness and completeness that will be outlined below are controversial, it will be helpful to have at least a plausible candidate for understanding informal validity. So without defending it, let me sketch one such account, calling it the instance account of informal validity. The idea behind it is simply that a formula is informally valid if and only if all of its natural language instances are true. So a formula like p → p can be seen not to be informally valid on this account as the sentence "If Obama is president of the US then it is necessary that Obama is president of the US" is a false instance. Of course, it is not completely clear which sentences count as instances, and more generally, what is meant by natural language. But for purposes of illustration, the account is clear enough.
The instance account of informal validity just sketched is reminiscent of the notion of logical truth for logics of quantification proposed in Tarski (2002 Tarski ( [1936 ), which is adapted to modal logics in (Williamson, 2012, chapter 3) . Williamson singles out those formulas ϕ such that ∀p 1 . . . ∀p n ϕ is true on the intended interpretation, where p 1 , . . . , p n are the propositional letters in ϕ, and calls them metaphysically universal. This assumes that we have an intended interpretation of quantification over proposition letters, and Williamson leaves it open how to best understand this. While metaphysical universality as defined by Williamson and the instance account of informal validity are closely related, we shouldn't assume that they are the same. This is particularly important in the context of two-dimensional semantics, which provides a number of entities that play some of the roles traditionally associated with propositions. Thus claims about all instance of a formula and its universal closure might come apart in unexpected ways; see the discussion in (Fritz, 2012, section 4) .
Informal validity according to the instance account and the resulting notions of informal soundness and completeness are structurally similar to the standard provability interpretation of modal logic (see (Boolos, 1993, pp. xxvi-xxvii) ). On the provability interpretation, a formula ϕ in the propositional modal language containing only the modal operator is called always provable if for every realization * , ϕ * is provable in Peano arithmetic. Here, a realization is a function from proposition letters to first-order formulas in the language of Peano arithmetic. This is extended to complex formulas in the natural way for Boolean connectives and by mapping ψ to Bew( ψ * ), where Bew(x) is a formula which expresses provability in Peano arithmetic and χ is the numeral of the Gödel number of χ. With this, a modal logic is called arithmetically sound if it contains only formulas that are always provable, and arithmetically complete if it contains all formulas that are always provable.
The analogy to the notions introduced above is straightforward. Instances of modal formulas correspond to the result of applying a realization to a modal formula; having only true instances corresponds to being always provable (i.e., all realizations mapping the formula to one that is provable in Peano arithmetic); and arithmetical soundness and completeness correspond to informal soundness and completeness. Of course, there are also important differences. Since always provable is introduced by a mathematical definition, the question which logic is arithmetically sound and complete is a purely mathematical one. And in fact, one can prove that the modal logic GL is arithmetically sound and complete. Since informally valid is introduced in an informal way, the question which logic is informally sound and complete (i.e., correct) can only be answered by a combination of formal and informal arguments. The aim of this paper is to lay out the basic structure of such a combination. I will first give a sketch of the overall strategy, and in the next two sections fill in the details, considering informal soundness and completeness in turn.
The Overall Strategy
The strategy followed below is an extension of the argument for the correctness of S5 (the familiar logic S5 for the modality ) presented in (Williamson, 2012, chapter 3) . S5 is the normal modal logic axiomatized by T = p → p and 5 = ♦p → ♦p, and is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of frames whose relation is an equivalence relation. Using the terminology of the present paper, Williamson first outlines an argument for the informal soundness of S5 by an induction on its proof system. He assumes that all of the axioms of the relevant proof system are informally valid and all of its rules preserve informal validity, in the sense that any formula they allow us to derive from informally valid formulas is informally valid as well. It follows by induction that all theorems of S5 are informally valid, and therefore that S5 is informally sound. For informal completeness, Williamson assumes informal soundness, which means that the correct logic contains S5 . If we also assume that modus ponens and uniform substitution preserve informal validity, it follows that the correct logic is a quasi-normal extension of S5 . He then presents a result characterizing all such extensions, and argues that all proper extensions contain a formula which is not informally valid. Thus S5 is the only remaining candidate for the correct logic, and so a fortiori informally complete.
Below, I will extend this strategy to the logic characterized by MD. In the next section, a proof system will be developed that allows a similar inductive argument for the informal soundness of this logic, and in the following section, a result is proven that characterizes all quasi-normal extensions of this logic in a way that allows for a similar argument for its informal completeness. In both cases, only outlines of the relevant arguments are given. Like the analogous arguments for the correctness of S5 , they rely on claims about informal validity of formulas, and I won't argue for all of them. This would require arguing for a specific account of informal validity, as well as taking a stand on a number of philosophically controversial issues; tasks I will not attempt here. Although somewhat incomplete, these considerations still tell us something interesting, as they give us a list of claims from which we can conclude that the logic characterized by MD is correct. I will also consider which of the relevant claims about informal validity are likely to be controversial, using the instance account of informal validity for concreteness.
The outlined strategy might remind one of Kreisel's squeezing argument in Kreisel (1967) . Kreisel argues that classical first-order logic contains all and only intuitively valid formulas. To do so, he first argues that all theorems of classical first-order logic are intuitively valid, by an appeal to the intuitive validity of (and preservation of intuitive validity by) all components of a suitable proof system for classical first-order logic. He then argues that all intuitively valid formulas are theorems of classical first-order logic, by arguing that any formula that is false in some set-theoretic structure is not intuitively valid. The crucial technical premise of the argument is the fact that classical firstorder logic is both characterized by the relevant proof system and the semantics given by set-theoretic structures (i.e., Gödel's completeness theorem). If we assume that what Kreisel calls intuitive validity is the same as what I have been calling informal validity, then Kreisel's argument can naturally be described in the terminology introduced above. The first step of the argument is an argument for informal soundness of classical first-order logic, and the second step is an argument for its informal completeness. And more abstractly, we are doing the same as what Kreisel attempts, namely to take an informal notion (suitably clarified, as argued in Smith (2011) ) and use formal results to prove that certain informal constraints motivated by this notion pin down a formal construct uniquely.
Could we also call the strategy that will be followed below a squeezing argument? This would not be natural. The term squeezing is appropriate in Kreisel's case, since his argument is of the following form: We have two mathematically defined notions D and V (deducible and formally valid formulas), and an informally introduced notion I (intuitively valid formulas). We argue informally that I contains D and V contains I. We squeeze by proving formally that D and V coincide in extension, thus showing that all three coincide in extension. While the informal soundness part of the present strategy is quite similar to the analogous step in the squeezing argument, the informal completeness part is rather different, as it is based on a syntactic characterization of extensions of the relevant logic, rather than a formal semantics for the logic. And this makes a big difference when we consider extending the argument to consequence relations. Kreisel's semantic method straightforwardly extends to informal/intuitive validity of arguments rather than formulas, and thus to logics understood as consequence relations. In contrast, the syntactic method used here does not immediately extend to such a setting. This can be seen from the fact that there are multiple consequence relations extending the consequence relation of S5 which agree on what follows from no premises; see (Williamson, 2012, chapter 3) . To extend the present strategy to consequence relations, additional assumptions are needed; see (Williamson, 2012, chapter 3) . Such extensions won't be considered in the following.
Informal Soundness
To show that a logic is informally sound, we have to argue that all of its theorems are informally valid. As noted above, a natural way of doing so in the case of S5 uses a standard proof system resulting from its definition as the normal modal logic axiomatized by T and 5 . One such system contains as axioms the propositional tautologies, K = (p → q) → ( p → q), T and 5 ; and as rules modus ponens, uniform substitution and the rule of generalization for (if ϕ is a theorem so is ϕ). If we can show that all of these axioms are informally valid and the three rules preserve informal validity, then it follows by induction that all theorems of S5 are informally valid. Of course, showing that the premises are true may be difficult in some cases. But at least, we now only have to consider a limited number of axioms and rules (finite if we replace the propositional tautologies by one of their finite axiomatizations), rather than an infinite set of theorems.
To give a similar argument for the informal soundness of the logic characterized by MD, we have to develop a syntactic characterization for it. This is done in a natural way in the next section. Unfortunately, we will see that the characterization obtained this way is not suitable for the kind of inductive argument for informal soundness we are interested in here. Therefore, an alternative proof system of the right shape will be derived in the subsequent section.
Axioms for the logic characterized by MD
As mentioned in Fritz (2012) , the logic characterized by MD is not normal. Therefore, standard methods for finding an axiomatization for the logic of a class of frames will not work for the logic characterized by MD. But we can roughly follow the strategy used, e.g., in Vlach (1973) and Crossley and Humberstone (1977) , by first finding an axiomatization of the logic of the class of matrix frames M and then syntactically deriving a second logic from this, which can then be proven sound and complete with respect to the class of matrix fwdes MD. In doing so, I will make use of some standard definitions and results in modal logic, which can be found, e.g., in Blackburn et al. (2001) , whose terminology and notation I largely adopt. First, we show that the logic characterized by M is 2Dg, which is defined as follows: Definition 1. Let 2Dg be the normal modal logic axiomatized by the following formulas:
These are just the axioms in Davies and Humberstone (1980) for the logic of necessity and actuality, plus four axioms concerning apriority and its relation to actuality. All of these axioms are Sahlqvist formulas, so the conditions on frames they express can be calculated by the Sahlqvist-van Benthem algorithm. The following table lists the axioms of 2Dg and their local frame correspondents, i.e., formulas of predicate logic expressing conditions that are satisfied by a point w of a frame if and only if the corresponding axiom is valid in that frame at that point:
Furthermore, the fact that the axioms are Sahlqvist formulas implies that 2Dg is strongly complete with respect to Fr 2Dg , the class of 2Dg-frames (frames in which 2Dg is valid):
Theorem 2. 2Dg is sound and strongly complete with respect to Fr 2Dg .
Proof. By the Sahlqvist completeness theorem; see, e.g., (Blackburn et al., 2001, Theorem 4.42) .
To prove that 2Dg is sound and strongly complete with respect to M, I will first show that a set of formulas is satisfiable on Fr 2Dg if and only if it is satisfiable on a class of frames R which is contained in Fr 2Dg and contains M. I will then show that a set of formulas is satisfiable on R if and only if it is satisfiable on M. These claims will be established by proving that R is the class of point-generated subframes of 2Dg-frames, as well as the class of bounded morphic images of matrix frames. The desired claims about satisfiability follow from these structural connections by well-known invariance results. Since a logic is sound and strongly complete with respect to a class of frames if and only if every set of formulas is consistent in the former if and only if it is satisfiable on the latter, the completeness of 2Dg with respect to M follows by Theorem 2. In a slightly different form, the intermediate class of frames R is used in Restall (2011) , so I will call them Restall frames. Calling a relation a function if it is serial and functional, and writing im(R) for the image of a relation R, they can be defined as follows:
• R @ is a function that maps any two R -related points to the same point, which is R -related to both of them, and
Let R be the class of Restall frames.
Lemma 4. Every Restall frame is a point-generated subframe of a 2Dg-frame.
Proof. Consider any Restall frame F = W, R , R @ , R A . We first show that for any w ∈ W , F w (the subframe of F generated by w) is F itself. Consider any v ∈ W . Since R @ is serial, there is a u ∈ W such that vR @ u. So also vR u, and by symmetry of R , uR v. It is also the case that u ∈ im(R @ ), so wR A u.
It follows from wR A u and uR v that v is in F w . As v was chosen arbitrarily,
To show that F is itself a 2Dg-frame, it suffices to go through the axioms of 2Dg and verify that the properties defined by them are satisfied by Restall frames. This is straightforward for all axioms except I4. For this, we can reason as follows: let v ∈ im(R A ). Then v ∈ im(R @ ), so there is a u such that uR @ v. It follows that uR v, and therefore that R @ must map u and v to the same point. So vR @ v, which means that R @ is reflexive on im(R A ).
The next result will make use of the fact that the formula N 1 = Ap → Ap, which will also play a role in the nesting problem described below, is a theorem of 2Dg. This is shown in the following lemma:
Proof. By the following derivation:
Note that Ap → Ap is also a Sahlqvist formula, and that it is therefore straightforward to calculate that it has the following local frame correspondent:
Lemma 6. Every point-generated subframe of a 2Dg-frame is a Restall frame.
Proof. Consider any 2Dg-frame F = W, R , R @ , R A and w ∈ W . Let F w = W , R , R @ , R A be the subframe generated by w. Since validity is preserved under taking generated subframes, all of the axioms of 2Dg are valid in F w .
Using T and 5 , it is routine to show that R is an equivalence relation. Likewise, D @ and D c@ imply that R @ is a function. With this, it follows from I1 and I2 that R @ maps R -related points to the same point, to which both are R -related.
To show that vR A u if and only if u ∈ im(R @ ), assume first that vR A u. Then by I4, uR @ u, and so u ∈ im(R @ ). It only remains to show that if u ∈ im(R @ ), then vR A u. We will do this in the rest of this proof, adopting the notation to write R [Y ] for the image of a set Y under a relation R. Let w be the element of W such that wR @ w . The existence and uniqueness of this point are guaranteed by the fact that R @ is a function. We first prove a preliminary claim:
. Clearly X ⊆ W . We first show that w ∈ X, and then that X is closed under each of the relations, that is, that R ∇ [X] ⊆ X for every modality ∇.
wR @ w , so both wR A w and wR w . Since R is symmetric, w R w, and therefore w ∈ X. Assume that v ∈ R [X]. Then there is a u ∈ X such that uR v. Since u ∈ X, there is a u ∈ W such that wR A u and u R u. By transitivity of R , u R v, and so v ∈ X.
. Then there is a u ∈ X such that uR A v, and therefore a u ∈ W such that wR A u and u R u. By Lemma 5, it follows that u R A v, and so by transitivity of R A that wR A v. Since R is reflexive, v ∈ X. This concludes the proof of claim 1. Now consider any u ∈ im(R @ ) and v ∈ W . We have to prove that vR A u. We do this by first proving that vR A w and then that w R A u.
Claim 2: vR A w . Since v ∈ W , it follows from claim 1 that there is a v ∈ W such that wR A v and v R v. By symmetry of R , vR v . Since wR @ w , by I3 also wR A w . So since R A is euclidean, v R A w . By Lemma 5, it follows that vR A w .
Claim 3: w R A u. Since u ∈ W , there is a u ∈ W such that wR A u and u R u. As we've seen before, wR A w , so since R A is euclidean, w R A u . Also u ∈ im(R @ ), so there is a u ∈ W such that u R @ u. By I1 also u R u, and with the fact that R is an equivalence relation, u R u . So by I2, it follows that u R @ u, and with I3, u R A u. Since R A is transitive, w R A u.
By transitivity of R A , it follows from claims 2 and 3 that vR A u.
With these Lemmas, it follows that 2Dg is sound and complete with respect to R. Without much effort, we could use (Restall, 2011, Theorem 8) to conclude that 2Dg is sound and complete with respect to M. But in order to bring out the structural connections between the classes of frames, we continue with our initial proof strategy:
Lemma 7. Every bounded morphic image of a matrix frame is a Restall frame.
Proof. By checking the conditions on Restall frames, one can verify that matrix frames are Restall frames. With this, the claim follows from the fact that R is closed under taking bounded morphic images, which is routine to prove.
Lemma 8. Every Restall frame is a bounded morphic image of a matrix frame.
Proof. Let F = W, R , R @ , R A be a Restall frame. We proceed by constructing a matrix frame F and a surjective bounded morphism f from F to F. I will use the following notation: [x] E is the equivalence class of x under the equivalence relation E. For a relation R that is a function, R(x) is the unique y such that xRy.
Let I be a set of cardinality |W | and F the matrix frame based on I. Let α : I → W be a surjection, and for every i ∈ I, let β i : I → [α(i)] R be a surjection such that β i (i) = R @ (α(i)). Such surjections exist for cardinality reasons, and the fact that R @ is a function for which R @ ⊆ R holds. We define
We can prove that f is a surjective bounded morphism from F to F. To show that it is a bounded morphism, one only has to go through the modalities and check the forth and back conditions. For surjectivity, consider any w ∈ W .
Theorem 9. 2Dg is sound and strongly complete with respect to M.
Proof. The preceding lemmas establish that Restall frames are both the pointgenerated subframes of 2Dg-frames as well as the bounded morphic images of matrix frames. Since truth is invariant under taking generated submodels (see (Blackburn et al., 2001 , Proposition 2.6)) as well as bounded morphisms between models (see (Blackburn et al., 2001 , Proposition 2.14)), one can show with standard arguments that a set of formulas is satisfiable on Fr 2Dg if and only if it is satisfiable on R, and that this is the case if and only if it is satisfiable on M. With Theorem 2, the claim follows.
In the same way in which Crossley and Humberstone (1977) derive their logic of real-world validity from their logic of general validity, we can use 2Dg to define a logic 2D, and infer from Theorem 9 that it is sound and complete with respect to MD. Since MD is the formal semantics that captures two-dimensional semantics, this completeness result means that the following definition of 2D gives us a syntactic characterization of our logic of two-dimensional semantics:
Definition 10. 2D ϕ if and only if 2Dg @ϕ.
Theorem 11. 2D is sound and strongly complete with respect to MD.
Proof. We show that any set of formulas is 2D-consistent if and only if it is satisfiable on MD. Note that it is straightforward to verify that 2D is quasinormal. First, let Γ be a 2D-inconsistent set. Then there are ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n ∈ Γ such that 2D ¬ i≤n ϕ i . So by definition of 2D, 2Dg @¬ i≤n ϕ i . Consider any matrix fwde F with set of points W , relation R @ , and distinguished points D, and let w ∈ D. By the soundness of 2Dg, F, w @¬ i≤n ϕ i . Since wR @ w, also F, w ¬ i≤n ϕ i . Hence Γ is not satisfiable on MD. Now, let Γ be a set that is not satisfiable on MD. Assume for contradiction that Γ @ = {@ϕ : ϕ ∈ Γ} is satisfiable on M. Then there is a matrix frame F with set of points W and relation R @ , and a point w ∈ W such that Γ @ is satisfiable in F at w. Since R @ is a function, there is a v ∈ W such that wR @ v, so Γ is satisfiable in F at v. But then v is a diagonal point, so Γ is satisfiable on MD. , so Γ @ is not satisfiable on M. By strong completeness of 2Dg it follows that Γ @ is 2Dg-inconsistent, and so that there are ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n ∈ Γ such that 2Dg ¬ i≤n @ϕ i . Since D @ and D c@ are theorems of 2Dg, @ distributes over Boolean connectives in 2Dg. Therefore 2Dg @¬ i≤n ϕ i , and so by definition of 2D, 2D ¬ i≤n ϕ i . Hence Γ is 2D-inconsistent.
An Alternative Proof System for 2D
With this completeness result, the definition of 2D gives us a syntactic characterization of the logic characterized by MD (which I will just call 2D from now on). But as announced, the inductive way of arguing for informal soundness demonstrated on S5 is not applicable to it, simply because 2D is not defined as the set of formulas derivable from a set of axioms using a set of rules. One might think that the specific construction of 2D at least allows us to argue similarly. In particular, one might propose to argue first that all theorems of 2Dg are informally valid, analogously to the above argument for the informal soundness of S5 , and then to infer from this that the theorems of 2D are informally valid. Indeed, the second step is quite feasible: it is easy to show using Definition 10 that 2D is the logic of the proof system that contains T @ = @p → p and all theorems of 2Dg as axioms, and modus ponens and uniform substitution as rules. Thus given the assumption that 2Dg is informally valid, the informal validity of 2D follows by induction from the premise that T @ is informally valid and modus ponens and uniform substitution preserve informal validity.
However, the first step of the proposal is problematic. 2Dg is defined as the normal modal logic axiomatized by some formulas, which means that the rules of its standard proof system include the rule of generalization for . Therefore, we would have to argue that if ϕ is an informally valid formula, so is ϕ. But this is likely not to be the case, since at least on the instance account of informal validity, @p → p is informally valid but (@p → p) is not, which is reflected by the fact that the former is a theorem of 2D, but the latter is not. (Note that there is no inconsistency in claiming that generalization for preserves informal validity in the context of S5 while it fails to do so in the context of 2D. See also (Williamson, 2012, chapter 3) .) The reason why the inductive argument for informal validity does not work here is that in contrast to 2D, being a theorem of 2Dg is not supposed to track being informally valid. As 2Dg is a proper subset of 2D, it can be seen as tracking a stronger property, which entails having an informally valid necessitation.
So to give an inductive argument for the informal soundness 2D, we need to develop an alternative proof system for it that has the required form. Doing so is the task of this section. The alternative proof system will be constructed in a way that allows us to outline an argument for the informal soundness of 2D in several steps, roughly speaking by first considering the logics of the individual modalities, and then the interactions between the modalities. As noted in Fritz (2012) , 2D contains as the logic of necessity and actuality the logic in Crossley and Humberstone (1977) according to real-world validity (which I will call Act), in the sense that it is a conservative extension of that logic. Also, 2D contains as the logic of apriority S5 A (S5 for the modality A), in the sense that it is also a conservative extension of that logic. So given that we can argue that Act and S5 A are informally sound, we only have to argue for the informal validity of the principles of 2D that are not already contained in these two logics. If we can specify these in a finite way, then we can argue inductively for the informal soundness of 2D, at least if we have previously argued that Act and S5 A are informally sound.
I start by formally defining Act. First, Actg is defined to be the normal modal logic axiomatized by the formulas T , 5 , D @ , D c@ , I1, and I2, which were given above. (As noted there, this is the axiomatization from Davies and Humberstone (1980) ; the one in Crossley and Humberstone (1977) contains an additional axiom, which can be show to be redundant.) From this, we derive Act by postulating that Act ϕ if and only if Actg @ϕ.
2D is quasi-normal, so it is clear that it has to contain the theorems of K and be closed under modus pones and uniform substitution. Thus in constructing our proof system, we can just add these as axioms and rules to the theorems of Act and S5 A . It only remains to add some axioms and rules that encode the interactions between the modalities in a finite way. Here is one way of doing so:
Definition 12. Let P 2D be the proof system containing as rules modus ponens, uniform substitution, and generalization for A, and as axioms the theorems of K, Act and S5 A , as well as the following formulas:
To show that the logic of P 2D is in fact 2D, we prove that I3 = (Ap → @p) is derivable in P 2D . To do this, we first show that Cp → Cp is derivable as well:
With this lemma, we can prove the desired result:
Theorem 15. The logic of P 2D is 2D.
Proof. We first show by induction on P 2D that its logic is included in 2D. Since 2D is a quasi-normal extension of both Act and S5 A , it contains the theorems of K, Act and S5 A and is closed under modus ponens and uniform substitution. It is straightforward to show that 2D contains the other axioms and is closed under generalization for A by semantic arguments using MD.
To show that 2D is included in P 2D , we first prove by induction on the construction of 2Dg that ϕ ∈ 2Dg implies P2D ϕ. If ϕ is one of the axioms of Actg, this follows from the fact that Actg ⊆ Act. If it is 4 A or 5 A , its necessitation is an axiom of P 2D . For I3, we have shown in Lemma 14 that P2D
I3. The case of I4 follows by @p → p ∈ Act and the rule of generalization for A. The rules of modus ponens and uniform substitution are straightforward by induction. Generalization for can be dealt with using 4 , and generalization for @ using I1 and I2, which are all in Act. Finally, the case of generalization for A follows by T , generalization for A and N 1. Now consider any ϕ ∈ 2D. By definition, @ϕ ∈ 2Dg, so by the claim just proven, P2D @ϕ. Since @p → p ∈ Act, it follows that P2D ϕ.
Outline of an Informal Soundness Argument
By Theorem 15, we can use P 2D to argue for the informal soundness of 2D in the same way we argued for the informal soundness of S5 : First, we show that all axioms of P 2D are informally valid, and then that its rules preserve informal validity. The first set of axioms of P 2D are the theorems of K, Act and S5 A , so we first have to show that these logics are informally sound.
Setting up such an argument is easiest for S5 A . Analogous to the case for S5 , since S5 A is the normal modal logic axiomatized by T A and 5 A , we can argue for its informal soundness by showing that the relevant axioms are informally valid and the relevant rules preserve informal validity. As noted in (Williamson, 2012, chapter 3) for the analogous case of S5 , we can also replace the rule of generalization for A by the axiom 4 A , if we replace the propositional tautologies by their necessitations.
We cannot argue this straightforwardly for Act, since it is derived from Actg in the way 2D is derived from 2Dg. But we can do so using the following alternative proof system P Act for Act:
Definition 16. P Act is the proof system containing the rules of modus ponens and uniform substitution and as axioms the necessitations of propositional tautologies and the following:
Proposition 17. The logic of P Act is Act.
Proof. That Act includes the logic P Act is straightforwardly proven by induction. The converse direction can be shown analogously to the corresponding direction in the proof of Theorem 15, using the proofs in (Williamson, 2012, chapter 3) for the cases of K , T and 5 .
Thus, we can argue for the informal soundness of Act by arguing that the axioms of P Act are informally valid and the rules P Act preserve informal validity. Similar to the two variants of providing a proof system for S5 A discussed above, we can also replace the axiom 4 A in P Act by a rule, which now has to be a restricted rule of generalization for , namely the rule which says that if ϕ is a theorem not containing any other modality than , then ϕ is a theorem as well (and we can use the propositional tautologies rather than their necessitations). The resulting proof system is in fact analogous to the proof system for a temporal logic with the indexical operator "now" presented in (Prior, 1968, p. 113) .
Arguing for the informal soundness of K might also seem difficult, since its standard axiomatization makes use of the problematic rule of generalization for . But we can dispense with this rule by using two axiom schemas. Let * Prop be the axiom schema whose instances are the formulas ♥ϕ where ♥ is a finite sequence of modal operators (i.e., , @ or A) and ϕ is a propositional tautology. Let * K ? be the axiom schema whose instances are the formulas ♥K ∇ where ♥ is a finite sequence of modal operators and ∇ is is a modal operator. We can show that K is the logic of the proof system containing the axiom schemas * Prop and * K ? and the rules of modus ponens and uniform substitution. (See (Williamson, 2012, chapter 3) who presents a variant of this that also dispenses with the rule of uniform substitution.) Thus the informal soundness of K follows from the informal validity of the instances of the two schemas and the preservation of informal validity by the two rules. Although this is an infinite axiomatization, the axioms are instances of two schemas, which means that a general argument for the informal validity all of them is feasible. It remains to argue for the informal validity of the additional axioms of P 2D and to argue that the additional rule of P 2D preserves informal validity. That is, we have to argue that 4 A , 5 A , D A and N 1 are informally valid and generalization for A preserves informal validity -the rules of modus ponens and uniform substitution have already been considered for the present language in the discussion of K. With Theorem 15, an inductive argument shows as in the case for S5 that this implies that all theorems of 2D are informally valid, and 2D is therefore informally sound.
This concludes the outline of the argument for the informal soundness of 2D. We now have a finite list of axioms or axiom schemas and rules, which can be used to argue that 2D is informally sound. In fact, we can use this list to give yet another proof system for 2D (eliminating some obvious redundancies): Proof. By inductions on the proof systems P 2D and P 2D .
So far, I have only outlined how one could give an inductive argument for the informal soundness of 2D, without considering the particular claims needed for this in any detail. I will now consider which ones of them are likely to be controversial. For concreteness, I will use the instance account of informal validity.
Arguing for the Premises
Let me start with the claims needed to argue that K is informally sound. Assuming classical propositional logic, the schema * Prop and the rule of modus ponens are likely to be uncontroversial. The rule of uniform substitution follows directly from the instance account of informal validity: Any natural language instance of a substitution instance of a formula is also a natural language instance of the original formula, so if a substitution instance of a formula has a false natural language instance, so does the original formula. Thus if a formula is informally valid (has no false natural language instances), so does any of its substitution instances. It is not quite clear how to argue for the instances of * K ? , but such (generalized) distributivity principles are widely accepted (see also (Williamson, 2012, chapter 3) for the case of necessity).
Claiming that Act is informally sound is more controversial. Part of the controversy comes from the philosophical discussion of S5 , where especially the axioms 4 and 5 have been criticized. Maybe the most well-known arguments against 4 are those in Salmon (1989) ; see also Gregory (2011) for further references. If the restricted rule of generalization for is used; although there are no obvious counterexamples to it, no good arguments for it have been proposed either, as noted in (Williamson, 2012, chapter 3) for the equivalent question concerning generalization for in the context of S5 . Another part that is likely to be controversial is the claim that the axioms of P Act involving @ are informally valid. Especially the axiom T @ has been called into question, e.g. in (Crossley and Humberstone, 1977, p. 15) and Hanson (2006) . However, on the instance account of informal validity, there seems to be an easy way of arguing for it: for any sentence S, the truth of If actually S then S seems to be guaranteed by the semantics of "actually". So in this example, the differences in evaluating the informal validity of T @ may be rooted differences concerning the understanding of informal validity.
As with Act, arguing that S5 A is informally sound is likely to be a challenging philosophical undertaking. Similar to above, it is the axioms 4 A and 5 A which are controversial. (If we use generalization for A instead of 4 A , see remarks on that rule below.) E.g., (Humberstone, 2004, p. 28) claims that apriority is suitably similar to the notions of demonstrability or informal provability, and refers to Burgess (1999) and others who claim that the logic of these notions is not S5 as it does not obey the principle 5. But to do defenders of two-dimensional semantics justice, we have to understand a priori as they do. (Chalmers, 2004, p. 208 ) describes this by saying that a priori is what "can be conclusively non-experientially justified on ideal rational reflection". Without further argument, it is not clear whether on this understanding, apriority is in fact "suitably similar" to the notions of demonstrability and informal provability. One would have to show that the particular arguments against 5 concerning demonstrability or informal provability apply to apriority as well.
However, there are further worries concerning the informal validity of 4 A and 5 A . Firstly, vagueness might provide counterexamples to 4 A , similar to the logic of definitely. Consider a sorites series, e.g., consisting of suitably arranged collections of grains of sand. Take the numeral n of the least natural number such that It is a priori that n grains of sand make a heap is true. Is then It is a priori that . . . it is a priori that n grains of sand make a heap true for any number of iterations of "it is a priori that"? If not, the 4 A principle is false on the instance account of informal validity.
A second worry concerns unentertainable propositions. Since unentertainable propositions are likely not to be expressible by sentences, let's consider the account of informal validity as having a true universal generalization (keeping in mind that we have to be careful with propositional quantifiers in the present context). Assume that if P is unentertainable, then so is any proposition containing P , e.g., the negation of P . Further, assume that being a priori entails being entertainable. Then if P is not entertainable, P is not a priori. Since the proposition that P is not a priori contains P , it is not entertainable, and therefore not a priori. So P is a counterexample to ∀p(¬Ap → A¬Ap), and so shows that 5 A is not informally valid. We can also use such propositions to argue that C should not be read as conceivable, if we assume that being conceivable entails being entertainable: If P is not entertainable, then P is not a priori, but then the negation of P is also not entertainable, so the negation of P is not conceivable. Thus if C is read conceivably, then P is a counterexample to ∀p(¬Ap → C¬p), which follows from the duality of A and C.
Of course, all of this is only worrying if there are any unentertainable propositions. To consider this, note that there are different ways unentertainable could be understood. One way to understand it would be to take it to mean it is (metaphysically) possible that someone entertains p. Then there might well be examples of unentertainable propositions; see (Fritz, 2012, section 4) for an example. But as pointed out there, we shouldn't assume without further argument that a proposition being a priori means that it is (metaphysically) possible that someone knows it a priori, and thus there is no reason to assume that apriority implies entertainability on the present understanding of the latter. To make the objection work, we need propositions that are unentertainable in some stronger sense, such that it is clear that being a priori implies being entertainable. Are there any such propositions?
One might think that this follows from a family of intensional paradoxes going back to Prior (1961) (see Tucker and Thomason (2011) for a recent discussion). Consider the following case. Assume for contradiction that I uniquely entertain that everything uniquely entertained by me is false. Now, either everything uniquely entertained by me is false or not everything uniquely entertained by me is false. If we assume that everything uniquely entertained by me is false, then since this is what I uniquely entertain, it follows that I uniquely entertain something true, contradicting the assumption. If we assume that not everything uniquely entertained by me is false, it follows that something is uniquely entertained by me and true. So since I uniquely entertain that everything uniquely entertained by me is false, everything uniquely entertained by me is false, contradicting the assumption. Thus I do not uniquely entertain that everything uniquely entertained by me is false. Hence we can show on logical grounds that there is something I do not uniquely entertain. Of course, there is nothing special about me that allows this argument to go through. So plausibly, what I do not uniquely entertain cannot be uniquely entertained by anyone. And since the argument only relied on a few basic principles of inference, it is plausible that uniquely entertaining it is not only metaphysically impossible, but impossible on broadly logical grounds. However, even if we can argue that being a priori implies being entertainable (in this very wide sense), this does not give us an arguments against 5 A , since the kind of unentertainability used here does not transfer from a proposition to any proposition containing it. Furthermore, the argument does not go through if being a priori only implies being entertainable, rather than being uniquely entertainable, and we have not been given reason to make the stronger assumption.
Besides arguing for the informal soundness fo K, Act and S5 A , we also have to argue for the additional principles of P 2D . Consider first the role of generalization for A on the instance account of informal validity. While it doesn't seem implausible that Aϕ has no false instances if ϕ has no false instances, there is also no obvious positive argument. This is particularly so on this account of informal validity which is only based on truth, rather than epistemic properties. E.g., it could be that it is a brute metaphysical fact that 4 has only true instances, which is not accessible to a priori reflection. It is pretty clear, though, that we won't come up with concrete counterexamples, since for this, we would have to establish that some ϕ has only true instances, although there is an instance of Aϕ which is false. This is implausible: Since we are not likely to come to know a posteriori that ϕ has only true instances, it is a priori that ϕ has only true instances. But for any instance of ϕ, it is a priori that if ϕ has only true instances, then that instance is true in particular. So for any instance of ϕ, we can conclude by K A that it is a priori that it is true, which plausibly implies that the corresponding instance of Aϕ is true. Of course, that we can show that we can't come up with a counterexample doesn't imply that there are none.
Consider now the extra axioms of P 2D . While all of them say something about the interactions between necessity and apriority in some way, N 1 stands out. The difference between it and the others is that 4 A , 5 A and D A are all necessitations of theorems of S5 A , which N 1 is not. D A is a highly plausible principle as violating it would mean (on the instance account of informal validity) that there is a sentence S such that Possibly, it is a priori that S and a priori that not S is true. It is hard to imagine how this could be true, which points in favor of D A . 4 A and 5 A are necessitations of principles considered above, and therefore face similar difficulties as discussed there.
N 1 is of special interest, as it plays a role in the so-called nesting problem, which is discussed in some detail in (Fritz, 2012, section 4) . The nesting problem originates from (Soames, 2005 , see Argument 5 on pp. 278-279), and it is presented in (Chalmers, 2011, endnote 25) as the following argument, concluding N 3 from premises N 1 and N 2:
Ap → p For a variant of this argument, Soames effectively argues that two-dimensional semantics is committed to the truth of the first premise, that the second premise is true, that the the conclusion is false, and that therefore, the argument refutes two-dimensional semantics. If one accepts the validity of the argument, it is natural to claim that the relevant instance of N 1 is in fact false, and therefore cannot be informally valid. No matter what the correct answer to the nesting problem is, it shows that N 1 is a controversial axiom. It also appears to capture a central aspect of the relations between necessity and apriority according to 2D. It is therefore interesting to prove that it essentially captures this aspect in P 2D , by showing that N 1 cannot be deduced if it is removed from P 2D :
Definition 20. Let P − 2D be the proof system containing the same rules and the same axioms, except for N 1, as P 2D .
Proof. Consider the fwde F given by the following diagram, with points 0 and 1 of which 0 is distinguished:
It is routine to show that the logic of P − 2D is valid in F. To see that F N 1, consider a valuation V such that V (p) = {0}.
Overall, we have seen that a number of axioms which have to be shown to be informally valid to argue that 2D is informally sound are quite controversial. Thus arguing for the informal soundness of 2D will likely be philosophically demanding. But the current outline is not only interesting if one wants to give an informal soundness argument. If one wants to argue that two-dimensional semantics is committed to an informally invalid formula, the alternative proof system P 2D is useful as well. Its use is in allowing us to limit our attention to a finite number of axioms (or axiom schemas) and rules among which we are guaranteed to find ones that are informally invalid, or do not preserve informal validity, if 2D is not informally sound.
Informal Completeness
Let's consider how one could argue that 2D is informally complete, that is, that every informally valid formula is a theorem of 2D. I start by illustrating the strategy with the logic S5 for necessity in more detail. The argument for informal completeness builds on that for informal soundness, so we assume that S5 is informally sound, and then ask the question whether it is also informally complete. In addition, we assume -as argued for in the informal soundness argument -that the informal validities are closed under modus ponens and uniform substitution. The basic idea of the argument is to show that any logic that contains S5 and is closed under these rules is either S5 itself or contains a formula that is not informally valid. With the assumptions, the informal completeness of S5 follows.
To make the strategy just outlined precise, let me introduce the following terminology: An extension of a logic Λ is a set of formulas that includes Λ. Such an extension is proper if it properly includes it, i.e. if it contains a formula not in Λ. Further, for any n ∈ N and modality ∇, define the following formula:
This formula is valid at a point in a frame or fwde if and only if the point can reach at most n points via the relation for ∇; see (Segerberg, 1971, p. 52, proof of Lemma 5.3) . Other formulas expressing the same condition be found in Dugundji (1940) and Gärdenfors (1973) . With these definitions, we can state the argument: Assume for contradiction that S5 is not informally complete. Since by assumption, S5 is informally sound and the informal validities are closed under modus ponens and uniform substitution, they form a proper quasi-normal extension of S5 . By Scroggs's theorem, proven in Scroggs (1951) , every such logic is characterized by a single finite frame with a universal relation. Let n be the number of elements in the frame that characterizes the informal validities. Then Alt n is valid on that frame and therefore informally valid. But Alt n is not informally valid. Contradiction, so S5 is informally complete.
Why is Alt n not informally valid? Consider the instance account of informal validity, and the instance of Alt n obtained by letting every p i stand for There are at least i donkeys . Then any disjunct of Alt n says that necessarily, if there are at least i donkeys, then there are at least i + 1 donkeys. But plausibly, for any natural number i, it is possible that there are exactly i donkeys, so it follows that all disjuncts of this instance of Alt n are false, and hence that this instance of Alt n itself is false.
Scroggs's theorem was originally formulated in an algebraic setting, in which we can state it by saying that while S5 is not characterized by a finite matrix, all of its proper extensions are characterized by a finite matrix; this property is called pretabularity. (A matrix is an algebraic structure that can be used like frames to interpret modal languages; note that there is no relation to the terminology of matrix frames.) It is not hard to see that 2D is not pretabular. But as we will see, pretabularity is not required to run the kind of argument just illustrated using S5 -we can do with local tabularity (see below).
Characterizing Extensions of 2D
To be able to construct the analogous argument for the informal completeness of 2D, we first need some technical results that characterize the extensions of 2D in a useful way. The natural idea is to show that any proper quasi-normal extension of 2D is characterized by a class of fwdes that are somehow limited in size, which entails that it contains a formula somehow analogous to Alt n . Note that we can limit the size of an fwde for 2D in two ways; on the one hand, we can limit the number of points accessible via the relation for A, and on the other hand, we can limit the number of points accessible via the relation for . It is therefore not surprising that the analogous formulas should contain instances of Alt ∇ n for both of the modalities A and . As it turns out, we can use the formulas of the form Alt A m ∨ CAlt n for natural numbers m and n, as we can show that any proper quasi-normal extension of 2D contains one of them. This is the characterization result we will prove in this section.
To do so, we start by proving a normal form theorem, which shows that every formula can equivalently be written in a certain syntactically simple form. From this, we can derive the fact that all quasi-normal extensions of 2D have the finite model property, which we can use to show that every such extension is characterized by a class of finite fwdes based on Restall frames. From this, the characterization result can be derived.
For the normal form theorem, we prove that any formula ϕ is 2D-equivalent to a formula ψ of a certain syntactically simple form, where ϕ and ψ are 2D-equivalent if ϕ ↔ ψ is a theorem of 2D. This is an extension of a familiar result about the logic S5, for which we can prove that every formula is equivalent to a formula that contains no nested modal operators. More specifically, let a formula be in S5 -cnf (cnf stands for conjunctive normal form) if it is a finite conjunction of finite disjunctions of formulas of the form ϕ, ♦ϕ or ϕ, where ϕ contains no modal operators. We can then prove that every formula (in the language containing only the modality ) is S5 -equivalent to one in S5 -cnf; see (Hughes and Cresswell, 1996, p. 101) . The analog to containing no nested operators in the context of 2D is to contain only and A, and these only unnestedly or with nested in A. More precisely, we can define the following normal form:
Definition 22. A formula is in 2D-cnf if it is a finite conjunction of finite disjunctions of formulas of the form Aϕ, Cϕ or ϕ, where ϕ is in S5 -cnf.
Theorem 23. Every formula is 2D-equivalent to one in 2D-cnf.
Proof. Define a formula to be in 2Dg-cnf if it is a finite conjunction of finite disjunctions of formulas of the form Aϕ, Cϕ or ψ, where ϕ is in S5 -cnf and ψ is in S5 -cnf or of the form @χ, where χ contains no modal operators. We can prove that every formulas is 2Dg-equivalent to one in 2Dg-cnf by an induction on the complexity of formulas analogously to the case of S5 -cnf. Any formula in 2Dg-cnf contains @ only unnestedly. The claim follows, as removing any such occurrence of @ produces a 2D-equivalent formula in 2D-cnf.
We can now show that every quasi-normal extension of 2D has the finite model property, which means that it is characterized by a class of finite models. We do so by noting that the normal form theorem just proven entails that 2D is locally tabular, which means that any set of formulas that are mutually nonequivalent in 2D and jointly contain only finitely many proposition letters is finite itself:
Lemma 24. Every quasi-normal extension of 2D has the finite model property.
Proof. By Theorem 23, 2D is locally tabular. This property is preserved in any quasi-normal extension of 2D, so the claim to be proven follows from the fact that every locally tabular quasi-normal modal logic has the finite model property. (See (Humberstone, 2011, p. 228 , Observation 2.13.5 (ii)); the claim can also be proven using a filtration argument along the lines of (Segerberg, 1971, p. 129, Theorem 6 .1)).
Lemma 25. Every quasi-normal extension of 2D is characterized by a class of finite fwdes based on Restall frames.
Proof. Let Λ be a quasi-normal extension of 2D. The well-known result that a logic with the finite model property has the finite frame property, see, e.g., (Blackburn et al., 2001, Theorem 3.28) , is straightforwardly extended to structures with distinguished elements. Thus it follows from Lemma 24 that Λ is weakly complete with respect to the class of fwdes it defines. Since 2Dg ⊆ 2D is normal, it follows from Lemma 6 that any fwde generated by a distinguished point of such an fwde is based on a Restall frame. Thus the class of such fwdes witnesses the claim of this lemma.
With this, we can prove the theorem needed for the informal completeness argument:
Proof. Consider any quasi-normal Λ ⊇ 2D such that for no m, n ∈ N, Λ Alt A m ∨ CAlt n . We prove that Λ = 2D. Let ϕ / ∈ 2D. By Theorem 25, there is a finite fwde F based on a Restall frame such that F, V, w ϕ for some valuation V and distinguished point w. Let m be the number of equivalence classes of points in F under the -relation and n the cardinality of the largest such equivalence class. Since Λ Alt A m ∨ CAlt n , it follows from Lemma 25 that there is an fwde F based on a Restall frame such that F Λ and F Alt A m ∨ CAlt n . Thus F contains at least m equivalence classes of points under the -relation and every such class has cardinality ≥ n. So one can choose a valuation V and distinguished point w such that there is a bounded morphism (see (Blackburn et al., 2001, pp. 57-63) ) from F , V to F, V mapping w to w. Since truth is invariant under bounded morphisms, F , V , w ϕ, and therefore ϕ / ∈ Λ. Hence Λ = 2D.
Before moving on to the outline of the informal completeness argument, let me note that we get two further properties of 2D as easy corollaries from the work done in this section, which are worth pointing out. Firstly, the actuality operator is redundant in 2D in the following sense:
Corollary 27. For every formula, there is a 2D-equivalent formula not containing @.
Proof. Immediate from Theorem 23, since no formula in 2D-cnf contains an occurrence of @.
The analogous result for Act was already shown in both Crossley and Humberstone (1977) and Hazen (1978) . Hazen et al. (2012) extend it to logics of necessity and actuality based on logics of necessity other than S5 . For a range of tense logics with an operator representing now, the analogous result was already proven in (Kamp, 1971, p. 251) .
Secondly, we can prove:
Corollary 28. 2D is decidable.
Proof. By construction, 2D is finitely axiomatizable, and by Lemma 24, it has the finite model property. Decidability follows from these two properties; see, e.g., the proof of (Blackburn et al., 2001 , Theorem 6.15).
Outline of an Informal Completeness Argument
As in the case of S5 , we can now outline an argument for the informal completeness of 2D on the assumption that 2D is informally sound and that modus ponens and uniform substitution preserve informal validity. By Theorem 26, it follows from these assumptions that if 2D is informally incomplete, then there are natural numbers m and n such that Alt A m ∨ CAlt n is informally valid. So it only remains to argue that no such formula is informally valid.
Arguing for the Premise
How controversial is it to claim that for any natural numbers m and n, Alt A m ∨ CAlt n is informally invalid? Let me use the instance account of informal validity again to consider this. As in the case of S5 , we can argue for the claim by considering arbitrary natural numbers m and n, and the instance of the formula obtained by letting every p i stand for There are at least i donkeys . We have to show that neither of the disjuncts of this instance is true. The first says that for some i ≤ m, it is a priori that if there are at least i donkeys, then there are at least i + 1 donkeys. But it is plausible that for any natural number i, it is not a priori that that there are not exactly i donkeys. Thus the relevant instance of Alt A m is false. Now consider the second disjunct. It says that it is not a priori that there is no natural number i ≤ n such that necessarily, if there are at least i donkeys, then there are at least i + 1 donkeys. But we have argued before that for every natural number i, it is possible that there are exactly i donkeys. So in particular, this is the case for all i ≤ n. This reasoning was a priori, so it is a priori that there is no i ≤ n such that necessarily, if there are at least i donkeys, then there are at least i + 1 donkeys. This means that the relevant instance of CAlt n is false. So Alt A m ∨ CAlt n has a false instance, and is therefore not informally valid.
So at least on the instance account of informal validity, it seems quite plausible that the relevant formulas are in fact not informally valid. Thus the case for informal completeness of 2D (given its informal soundness) is much stronger than the case for its informal soundness. So if one wants to argue against the correctness of 2D, the axioms and rules described in the section on informal soundness seem to be much more promising candidates.
Conclusion
We have seen outlines of arguments for the informal soundness and completeness of 2D. If one can support the claims on which these arguments rely, one can show that the logic of necessity, actuality and apriority according to two-dimensional semantics is correct. This would rebut any argument against two-dimensional semantics that proceeds by claiming that two-dimensional semantics is committed to an informally invalid principle concerning these three modalities. Moreover, this would constitute an indirect argument in favor of two-dimensional semantics, simply by observing that if it gets the logic of necessity, actuality and apriority right, it gets essential aspects of what it is supposed to describe right. The considerations on how to argue for informal soundness and completeness have also highlighted some controversial principles to which two-dimensional semantics is committed, and thereby indicated ways of using 2D to argue against two-dimensional semantics.
These ways of using the formal logic 2D to argue for or against two-dimensional semantics must be qualified in an important way. As noted in Fritz (2012) , the informal accounts of two-dimensional semantics given in the literature can be cashed out formally in different ways. Therefore, there are a number of logics that can be claimed to formalize two-dimensional semantics, of which 2D is only one natural candidate. So, e.g., if a convincing argument is presented that shows that some theorem of 2D is informally invalid, a proponent of two-dimensional semantics can reply that this is a result of 2D not capturing the ideas of twodimensional semantics faithfully. However, in this case, it is the burden of the two-dimensionalist to spell out what is wrong with 2D, and what the correct logic of necessity, actuality and apriority according to two-dimensional semantics is. Although the initial argument would then not lead to the desired conclusion of refuting two-dimensional semantics, it would still give rise to a debate leading to a valuable clarification of two-dimensional semantics. An example of a tentative development in this direction can already be found in the discussion of the nesting problem in (Chalmers, 2011, endnote 25) and Chalmers and Rabern (2012) .
Another interesting conclusion can be drawn from the above discussion of the informal soundness of 2D using the alternative proof system P 2D . The additional principles of P 2D can be seen as characterizations of the interactions of apriority with necessity and actuality according to two-dimensional semantics. As motivated above, the axiom N 1 = Ap → Ap is of special importance among them. Since it is the first premise of the nesting problem, this indicates that finding the correct answer to the nesting problem might not only be necessary to settle whether the logic 2D is correct, but that it can occupy a central position in considerations concerning the correct logic of necessity, actuality and apriority. Since the relations and interactions of necessity, actuality and apriority are not only relevant for the discussion on two-dimensional semantics, I believe that the nesting problem deserves more attention than it has received so far.
